Here is the schedule for this session, with excerpt links (requires course enrollment):
7:30 Announcements and welcome
7:35 Thinking Fast and Slow (Kahneman)
8:00 Born to Be Good: The Science of a Meaningful Life (Keltner)
8:25 The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity (Appiah)
8:50 Break
8:55 The Orchid and the Dandelion: Why Some People Struggle and How All Can Thrive (Boyce)
9:20 The Collected Schizophrenias: Essays (Wang)
9:45 General discussion
10 thoughts on “Week 10 (6/4/19) – Student Presentations I”
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SymSys 203 
The Western idea that the nature of mankind is self-interested lowers our jen ratio; it changes our frame of people’s behavior and our expectations for their motives. If we look at people’s behavior with that lens, then we will make assumptions and assign narratives consistent with our self-interested frame. We are also more likely to act self-interested if we expect that of ourselves, and become confused when acting selfishly detracts from our happiness.
This frame seems faulty; it is at odds with empirical evidence that people are happy, sometimes even more happy, when they give to others than when they perform actions that benefit themselves. We can see this at the individual level in the money allotment experiment, relationally within marriages: that marriages with high jen ratios flourish: when we generously give our partners credit and see the good even in their foibles (5), and at a national level, where when people trust each other, nations are happier.
While the trends of well-being are declining, we can use this idea of a jen ratio and the empirical studies that show that prosociality and helping others increases our own happiness, to change the way we think about the nature of mankind, from self-interested to also prosocial. This way, we can expect better of our peers and live more congruently with our true natures. Our true natures seem to indicate that eudaimonia is characterized by serving others and accomplishing goals that benefit not only ourselves but those around us and our communities.
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In The Lies That Bind, Appiah says that identity “give[s] you a sense of how you fit into the social world” and makes it possible for “you to speak as one ‘I’ among some ‘us’: to belong to some ‘we’” (9). Identity also gives people explanations for certain actions. “People do and don’t do because they are Jains,…they themselves think…, ‘I should be faithful to my spouse…or speak the truth…or avoid harming this animal…because I am a Jain’”(9). Because people take identity beyond simply labels they give “normative signature” to their group. “… identity matters for practical life: for their emotions and their deeds…Their common identity gives them reason, they think, to care about and help one another. It creates what you could call norms of identification: rules about how you should behave, given your identity” (9).
This leads us to questions about how strongly your identity should influence how you behave. Appiah raises questions like “How much can one Ewe or one Jain legitimately ask of another?” and “Does being Ewe mean you ought to teach the Ewe language to your children? ” (9). He doesn’t directly answer these questions but it seems he would say that these are lies of a sort, but they still bind. Identity shapes but is not all encompassing.
One interesting case study is immigration. In the US, for example, immigrants tend to adopt US culture. Should these immigrants be responsible for understanding the cultures of their parents. Should 3rd/4th/etc. generation immigrants take it upon themselves to teach their children the identity of the original immigrant ancestors? These generations are so far removed, it seems it would be a stretch to ask them to do so. And if they don’t, are they in some ways responsible for the death of an identity?
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In Born to Be Good, Keltner addresses the role of competition and self-interest between humans. He notes that “Cooperation and kindness are, by implication, cultural conventions or deceptive acts masking deeper self-interest” (9). Although he does note that we do not always behave in ways that solely promotes our self-interest, he believes that the center of our beings revolves around this evolutionary concept. He pairs the idea of a “jen ratio” and how humans can act out of love and generosity as well (4). He also claims that “Nations whose citizens bring the good in others to completion thrive” (6). The nations that celebrate each other’s successes and triumphs often have the highest overall well-being. Therefore, large-scale cultural differences would have a greater effect on society than we might think. If following Keltner’s claims, collectivist cultures should have higher overall well-being. To continue, it seems as though we could draw on these collectivist ideas to combat the innate self-centered motivations and ultimately improve our overall “jen” and well-being. A community’s effect of overall well-being and helping attitudes is evident to see. As Tomasello touched on in A Natural History of Human Morality, he stated that “in-group favoritism” is a key factor in selfless acts towards others. Therefore, if we can expand our trust in others and create larger and more diverse communities, not only will our morality increase, but we will experience the “deeply satisfying moment when you bring out the goodness in others” (4). In that sense, a positive relationship of expanding a community to increase the experience of jen could promote overall well-being in an individual’s immediate community, and beyond.
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From the excerpt of the Kahneman reading, the book discusses the interaction of 2 fictitious characters: “the automatic System 1 and the effortful System 2.” (415) Page 417 discusses how “System 1 acquires its bad reputation as the source of errors and biases.” He later discusses that “The way to block errors that originate in System 1 is simple in principle: recognize the signs that you are in a cognitive minefield, slow down, and ask for reinforcement from System 2.” Kahneman also suggests solving the problem by letting organizations “enforce the application of useful checklists, as well as more elaborate exercises” and learning precise vocabulary. (418)
Earlier in the excerpt, Kahneman mentions the use of “nudges” to get people to make the right decisions without curtailing their freedom. In particular, “The default option is naturally perceived as the normal choice.” (413). The question that arises is whether nudges could be used to make people become less biased or use more of system 2. For example, cases of police brutality on people of color tend to be attributed to the officers making the wrong decisions due to the suspect’s race (i.e. using System 1). Could the checklists mentioned earlier make the non-violent action feel like the norm? Nudging might already be part of the solutions that Kahneman proposed, but this isn’t explicitly stated in this excerpt.
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In Born to Be Good, Keltner challenges the idea that humans are evolutionarily wired to pursue self-interest by maximizing desire, competing, and being vigilant to what is bad (4). He proposes a new science focused on positive emotion which he calls “jen science” (3). Jen, a Confucian principle, emphasizes “bring(ing) the good things (but not bad things) of others to completion” (3-4). Keltner recommends the jen ratio – a ratio between recent actions in which people have brought the good and bad in others to completion – as a measure of the “balance of good and bad in your life.” (4)
I am intrigued by the jen ratio given its comprehensive scope. It focuses on one’s community rather than oneself, emphasizing the good and bad brought to completion in one’s environment rather than just in oneself or by oneself. For this reason, it seems that the jen ratio provides an effective measure of well-being (5). Many common measures of well-being focus on isolated individual circumstance—wealth, health, safety, self-reported happiness—and disregard social circumstance. Given that human beings are social creatures (13), the jen ratio’s incorporation of social environment into measures of well-being is noteworthy. I believe the primary significance of jen science is that it highlights the degree to which individual well-being is determined by social relationships.
The prevalence of jen in a culture likely depends on the culture’s principles. I suspect that jen ratios are higher in collectivist communities than in individualist ones. The individualism that American culture promotes—emphasizing autonomy, personal success, and prioritizing the individual over the collective—therefore likely reduces its members’ well-being. With jen in mind, the case for collectivism relates not only to the equitable distribution of resources but also to the recognition that individuals are made better off when they enjoy strong communal ties.
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In “Lies That Bind,” Kwame Anthony Appiah introduces the idea that we often erroneously suppose that, “at the core of each identity there is some deep similarity that binds people of that identity together (xvi).” Appiah believes that while identities can be dangerous, as identities, especially those related to religion, nation, race, class, and culture, “divide us against one another (xvi),” identities also “make it possible for groups, large and small, to do things together (xvi).”
Appiah introduces three features that all ways of grouping people by identities are similar. The first is that “every identity comes with labels (8).” The second is that identities “matter to people (9).” And the third feature that all identities share is that they “give you reasons to do things (10),” and “gives others reasons to do things to you (10).” Appiah notes that “all these (shared) dimensions of identity are contestable (12),” but I am curious to know whether the contestability of identity pushes groups to do things together or leads us to divide ourselves against each other?
Appiah states in his introduction that while “there’s no dispensing with identities…we need to understand them better if we can hope to reconfigure them, and free ourselves from mistakes (xvi)”. In his writing on gender, Appiah writes about how a better understanding of the biological variability of sex chromosomes and sexual morphology allowed people to understand that “there just isn’t a sharp division of human beings into two sexes (14).” As a result of our improved understanding of gender identity, we now make distinctions between sex and gender and allow for citizens to identify themselves. In this case, a deeper understanding of identity led to “liberation from old patterns of oppression (12),” however, is it possible for an enhanced understanding of identity to lead to more potentially harmful ingroup/outgroup conflicts? How would Appiah resolve this question?
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Within the selected portion of Orchid and the Dandelion, Boyce presents his findings that lead to his Orchid and the Dandelion hypothesis and presents further evidence that provides a link between shyness and “orchid” children. While interesting, I wonder what the real-world implications for “orchid” children are. Is this the type of childhood characteristic that requires additional education and support, and early intervention, or is this more simply an interesting research bit to lend context to the complexity that is childhood?
Take for example a three-year-old child in a low-income neighborhood entering preschool for the first time. His teachers notice the characteristics seen by Boyce consistent with his being an “orchid” child. Where are we to go with this information? Is this, by itself, grounds for the child to receive additional support, beings that he could, theoretically, land on the negative end of the spectrum laid out by Boyce (110)? And if not, at what point does it become necessary to intervene? Going further, perhaps a pediatrician screens him at a young age, and his neurobiological responses were spot on with an “orchid” child. What is the pediatrician to do?
Shyness is not – in and of itself – something that society sees as inherently bad, or something that requires “treatment” to “remedy”. While perhaps not preferable, unless it goes to the point of significant impairment (such as an anxiety disorder), that person and their reaction is considered pretty normal, particularly in childhood. Then, what does this “orchid” child (against their “dandelion” counterpart) really mean in the grand sense of real-world problems and real-world solutions? I would be interested to see whether Boyce explores this further within his book.
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My comment this week is on “The Collected Schizophrenias” and will address the connections between Wang’s view of mental disorder and Barrett’s theory on emotion.
In the excerpt, Wang notes that the diagnosis of disorders like schizophrenia have existed since “the ancient Egyptians” (5) and in Eastern medicine with names like the “Fire typology” (22). Per Wang, there is little difference between this ancient category and modern psychiatric diagnosis, where “There is no blood test, no genetic marker…and schizophrenia itself is nothing more or less than a constellation of symptoms that have frequently been observed as occurring in tandem. Observing patterns and giving them names is helpful mostly if those patterns can speak to a common cause, or better yet, a common treatment or cure” (9-10). In other words, psychiatric conditions are not necessarily real and distinct phenomena, merely human categorizations generated alongside the goal of treatment. This mirror’s Barrett’s constructed emotions framework almost perfectly: “This category is clearly and entirely a construction of the human mind…In fact, the goal is the only thing that holds together a category” (Barret 92).
Wang subsequently discusses a recent effort, the RDoC, aimed at finding observable fingerprints for mental disorders. These scientists hope to bring “hard science” to psychiatry (16), but Wang remains skeptical of its ability to improve diagnosis— if most disorders are merely constellations of patterns sharing “no perceptual features” (Barret 92), this effort will fail to provide any insight into the causes and signs of the underlying disease.
So, while both Eastern medicine and modern psychiatry might receive criticism for not understanding the underlying causes of mental disorder, they undoubtedly cluster symptoms in socially convenient, goal oriented ways. And since we’ve not come that much closer—from ancient Egypt to today—to attributing true causality to many of these disorders, we should still put some faith in the ability of psychiatric categorization to put our minds at ease (5).
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Re-posting with misspelling of Barrett’s name corrected:
My comment this week is on “The Collected Schizophrenias” and will address the connections between Wang’s view of mental disorder and Barrett’s theory on emotion.
In the excerpt, Wang notes that the diagnosis of disorders like schizophrenia have existed since “the ancient Egyptians” (5) and in Eastern medicine with names like the “Fire typology” (22). Per Wang, there is little difference between this ancient category and modern psychiatric diagnosis, where “There is no blood test, no genetic marker…and schizophrenia itself is nothing more or less than a constellation of symptoms that have frequently been observed as occurring in tandem. Observing patterns and giving them names is helpful mostly if those patterns can speak to a common cause, or better yet, a common treatment or cure” (9-10). In other words, psychiatric conditions are not necessarily real and distinct phenomena, merely human categorizations generated alongside the goal of treatment. This mirror’s Barrett’s constructed emotions framework almost perfectly: “This category is clearly and entirely a construction of the human mind…In fact, the goal is the only thing that holds together a category” (Barrett 92).
Wang subsequently discusses a recent effort, the RDoC, aimed at finding observable fingerprints for mental disorders. These scientists hope to bring “hard science” to psychiatry (16), but Wang remains skeptical of its ability to improve diagnosis— if most disorders are merely constellations of patterns sharing “no perceptual features” (Barrett 92), this effort will fail to provide any insight into the causes and signs of the underlying disease.
So, while both Eastern medicine and modern psychiatry might receive criticism for not understanding the underlying causes of mental disorder, they undoubtedly cluster symptoms in socially convenient, goal oriented ways. And since we’ve not come that much closer—from ancient Egypt to today—to attributing true causality to many of these disorders, we should still put some faith in the ability of psychiatric categorization to put our minds at ease (5).
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In the “The Collected Schizophrenias” we learn about the history of the DSM and psychiatric diagnoses. Esme Weijun Wang alludes to her own personal journey with labeling her disorder, and teaches us to ask the questions, “How did this come to be?.. Why did this happen?…But what on earth do I do now?” (25). What I gathered right off the bat is that these labels matter significantly. As she writes, “I am not a psychiatrist, psychologist, or therapist, but I am a patient whose life is affected by the labels that the DSM provides” (12).
What I am curious to explore and discuss further is the idea that, “humans are the arbiters of which diagnoses are given to other humans.” How do we make this life-dependent process of diagnosing mental illness more “capital S scientific”? The DSM is merely a cluster of symptoms, not objective measures. And regardless of whether they are correct or incorrect, they still have a severe impact on patients’ lives. She also speaks to the toll that it can take on those who diagnose these symptoms as well, describing the work she did for SCID as “emotionally draining” and difficult to provide real solutions regarding the “what do I do now?” question.
If there comes a time in which the DSM and RDoc and other organizations can consolidate the information into trusted machine learning algorithms that may be able to better diagnose such severe disorders, would humanity ever truly accept them? Furthermore, if we are able to dimensionally define these symptoms, would patients and/or doctors be the benefactors? Would they suffer negative implications? She notes the pros and cons of “clinical flexibility” in promoting patient life growth and confidence. Examining the possible dehumanization of the DSM could threaten this flexibility in answering her big questions.
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